Skill-Biased Technical Change is a shift in the production technology that favors skilled over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand.
Skill-Biased Technical Change (SBTC thereafter) is a shift in the production technology that favors skilled (e.g., more educated, more able, more experienced) labor over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative demand. Ceteris paribus, SBTC induces a rise in the skill premium-the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages.
From factor-neutral to factor-biased technical change
Economic theory views the production technology as a function describing how a collection of factor inputs can be transformed into output, and it defines technical change as a shift in the production function, i.e., a change in output for given inputs. The traditional measure of economy-wide technological change, introduced by Solow (1957) , is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP, thereafter). Solow defines a TFP advancement as an increase in output that leaves marginal rates of transformations untouched for given inputs; thus, a change in TFP is a form of factor-neutral technical change.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that the aggregate production function is constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas in aggregate capital (K) and aggregate labor (L) services, i.e.
, where Y is aggregate output, α is the elasticity of output to capital, and Z denotes precisely TFP. If output and input markets are competitive, then the share of income going to capital equals α. Solow's (1957) fundamental insight is that, armed with this estimate of α and measures of (Y, K, L) from national accounts, neutral technical change can be quantified "residually". This clever and parsimonious approach to growth accounting has dominated the literature for decades, creating an overwhelming consensus that neutral technological improvements are the primary source of growth in income per capita.
However, a key fact recently emerged from the data highlights the limits of this conceptualization of technical change. In the last three decades, the rental price of skilled labor has soared dramatically relatively to that of unskilled labor despite a major uprise in the relative supply of skills: for example, the college wage premium-defined as the ratio between the wage of college graduates and the wage of high-school graduates-jumped from 1.45 in 1965 to 1.7 in 1995, while the relative supply of college skills tripled over the same period. Given the observed movements in the relative quantities, these price changes could not be generated by movements "along the production function". Neutral technical change is, by definition, silent on changes in relative prices. Therefore, to make sense of these recent developments, one must introduce the concept of factor-biased technical change.
For this purpose, I now generalize the aggregate production function above by letting labor input, L, be a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of skilled and unskilled labor, L s and L u , with factor-specific productivities A s and A u :
At this point, it is not necessary to specify what makes a worker more skilled than another: it could be education, innate ability or experience. The (log of the) marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between the two labor inputs is
Note that the TFP term Z does not enter the above equation. A change in the ratio A s /A u is a form of factor-biased technical change since it modifies the marginal rates of transformation, at a given input ratio. In particular, under the empirically plausible parametric assumption
With competitive input markets, the (log of the) skill premium can be read off the right-hand side of (2) as well. Therefore, skill-biased technical change induces an increase in the relative productivity of skilled labor that raises its relative demand and, ceteris paribus, the skill premium. 
The skill-bias of information technologies
Recent shifts in technology have been skill-biased. But SBTC appears all but an unexplained residual very much like Solow TFP, a "black box" that needs to be filled with economic content.
What really accounts for this shift in the production process over the past three decades? The timing of the rise in the skill premium has coincided with the rapid diffusion of information and communication technologies in the work place. Thus, a natural candidate for this wave of SBTC is the "information technology revolution". Technology-skill complementarity is the force behind SBTC. This decline in price led to an increased use of equipment capital in production. At least since Griliches (1969) , various empirical papers support the idea that skilled labor is relatively more complementary to equipment capital than is unskilled labor.
As a result of capital-skill complementarity in production, the faster growth of the equipment stock pushed up the relative demand for skilled labor and, in turn, the skill premium.
More explicitly, these authors generalize the aggregate production function to:
where K s denotes structures capital, and K e equipment capital. Profit-maximizing behavior of price-taking firms implies that the skill premium (and the MRT between labor inputs) can be approximately written as The Nelson-Phelps conjecture implies that the rise in the skill premium is transitory: it is only in the early adoption phase of a new technology that those who adapt more quickly can reap some benefits. As time goes by, there will be enough workers learning how to work with the new technology to offset the wage differential. Note the difference with the hypothesis set forth by Krusell et al., where the effect of capital deepening on the skill premium is permanent.
The third formalization of this hypothesis is based on Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . These authors argue that information technologies reduce costs of data storage, communication, monitoring and supervision activities within the firm which trigger a shift towards a new organizational design. In particular, the layers in the hierarchical structure can be reduced, so that the organization of the firm becomes "flatter." Workers no longer perform routinized, specialized tasks, but they are now responsible for a wide range of tasks within teams. Therefore, adaptable workers who have general skills and who are more versed at multi-tasking activities benefits from this transformation. In other words, the change in technology induces an organizational shift which is skill-biased. An elegant formalization of this hypothesis is contained in Garicano and Rossi (2004).
Microeconomic evidence consistent with all these formulations of the technology-skill complementarity hypothesis is offered by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) . Based on data on the skill content and tasks of various occupations, they split job requirements into "routine"
and "non-routine" tasks and document that, starting from the 1970s, the labor input of nonroutine analytic and interactive tasks increased sharply relative to routine cognitive and manual tasks. This shift was concentrated in rapidly computerizing industries and it was pervasive at all educational levels. They interpret these findings as evidence that information technologies substituted unskilled labor employed on simple and more repetitive tasks-more amenable to computerization-and complemented workers endowed with generalized problem-solving, complex communication, and analytical skills.
Endogenous direction of technical change
In the same vein as the endogenous growth literature developed in the 1990s, one could contend that not only the speed-as traditionally argued-but also the direction of technical change is endogenous. Profit incentives of innovators determine the amount of R&D activity directed towards different factors of production (Acemoglu, 1998) . The main determinants of profit incentives are market size, relative prices and institutions. These forces can shed light on numerous episodes in the history of technology.
Under the assumption that the R&D cost is fixed, the market size of the innovation determines its revenues. The expansion of educated labor over the postwar period made it profitable to develop machines complementary to skilled workers. The vast migration wave towards English cities during the late eighteenth century opened the way to the development of the factory system and, later, to the Tayloristic assembly line which quickly replaced skilled artisans' craft shops. Incidentally, this is a notable example of unskill-bias which proves that, historically, the direction of technical progress has varied.
Profit maximization dictates that, ceteris paribus, innovation be directed towards those To conclude: traditionally, in the growth literature, technological progress is associated to productivity improvements that benefits all workers and it is viewed as the chief longrun determinant of average income levels. The notion of "skill-bias"-and the literature that has recently blossomed around it-has introduced the theoretical possibility that technological progress benefits only a sub-group of workers, placing technical change also at the centerstage of the income distribution debate.
Giovanni L. Violante
See also: biased and unbiased technical change; capital measurement; diffusion of technology; economic growth in the very long run; endogenous growth; general purpose technologies; Griliches, Zvi; growth and human capital; growth, models of; Habakkuk, John Hrothgar (v1915); human capital; Industrial Revolution: mechanisms; inequality and growth; inequality: explanations; information technology and economic growth; labor's share of income; measurement of economic growth; production functions; productivity: measurement problems; Solow, Robert; substitutes and complements; technical change; technology; Technology and wage inequality; total factor productivity; vintage capital.
